Fireworks are a common component used in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The US Government is asking consumer fireworks retailers to be aware of this phenomenon and familiarize themselves with some possible indicators of suspicious activity. This list is not inclusive, nor is it intended to limit the lawful conduct of innocent persons. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be considered.
Recent incidents in the Homeland demonstrate that consumer fireworks—widely used during the upcoming 4 July 2013 celebrations—can be misused by criminals and violent extremists to construct improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Consumer fireworks are defined as devices that produce audible and visible effects by combustion, containing between 50-130 milligrams of explosive material. They are banned in Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.
The following photos depict soldiers from the 252nd Combined Arms Battalion training in June for their role as a “rapid reaction force” capable of responding anywhere in the state of North Carolina within “four to eight hours with additional forces…
This study evaluates the oversight of national security and intelligence agencies by parliaments and specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies, with a view to identifying good practices that can inform the European Parliament’s approach to strengthening the oversight of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and, to a lesser extent, Sitcen. The study puts forward a series of detailed recommendations (including in the field of access to classified information) that are formulated on the basis of in-depth assessments of: (1) the current functions and powers of these four bodies; (2) existing arrangements for the oversight of these bodies by the European Parliament, the Joint Supervisory Bodies and national parliaments; and (3) the legal and institutional frameworks for parliamentary and specialised oversight of security and intelligence agencies in EU Member States and other major democracies.
A series of “limited release” directives from the Department of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff including instructions, directives and manuals detailing DoD policy on a variety of topics from counterintelligence to the use of lasers in space.
This manual provides guidance to Joint Staff, Service (including Service intelligence centers and reserve components), Combatant Command (CCMD), and Combat Support Agency (CSA) personnel for conducting collaborative intelligence planning (IP) primarily in support of Combatant Commander (CCDR) campaign plans, contingency plans, and orders.
Standard operating procedures for Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Demonstrator (BAMS-D) program flights from December 2011.
An investigation report concerning the crash of a RQ-4A Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle on June 11, 2012 during a training flight near the Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Maryland. The report concludes that the accident occurred due to ” mechanical malfunction of the right ruddervator actuator”. However, the pilot “failed to follow the proper emergency procedures” which “did not produce disastrous results in this particular event; however, future breaches of established procedures could produce a different outcome.”
Implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures under reference (a) regarding the illumination of satellites by lasers to protect space assets from any potential harm that could be caused by such illumination.
This publication provides guidance for planning, executing, and assessing joint space operations. It provides space doctrine fundamentals for all joint forces; describes the military operational principles associated with support from, through, and operating in space; explains Joint Staff, combatant command (CCMD), United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and USSTRATCOM functional and Service component relationships and responsibilities; and establishes a framework for the employment of space forces and space capabilities.
Within DHS, this overarching responsibility for critical infrastructure protection is delegated to the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), specifically the Sector-Specific Agency Executive Management Office (SSA EMO) CF Branch for commercial facilities. Serving as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the CF Sector, the CF Branch works with its partners to address and highlight low-cost preparedness and risk management options in the products and tools it makes available to the private sector. For example, the CF SSA has been working to produce a suite of protective measures guides that provide an overview of best practices and protective measures designed to assist owners and operators in planning and managing security at their facilities or events. The Protective Measures Guide for the U.S. Outdoor Venues Industry is one of these guides and reflects the special considerations and challenges posed by the Outdoor Venues Subsector.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction on disclosing, releasing, and transferring information systems security (INFOSEC) products or associated communications security (COMSEC) information to foreign governments.
In accordance with (IAW) reference a, MISO replaces the term psychological operations (PSYOP). This instruction provides strategic direction for inclusion of MISO to support the full range of military operations including military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; major operations and campaigns; and as an integrated information activity within the DOD’s overall contribution to United States Government (USG) communication strategies.
DoD Instruction O-3115.07 concerning Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) or intelligence comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signal intelligence, however transmitted.
DIB CS/IA is the DoD program to protect critical DoD unclassified program, technology, and operational information residing on, or transiting, DIB unclassified networks. DoD Components and industry participants collaborate to protect DoD information through the development, implementation, and execution of DoD and DIB processes and procedures.
Malicious actors may leverage the Internet to gain information against a potential target to support pre-operational planning efforts for kinetic or cyber attacks. Malicious actors can use Internet search engines for information such as maps, company photographs or blueprints, and gain additional details from social media sites and Web blogs. Some actors may use more sophisticated techniques—such as phishing, spear phishing, or actual penetration of an organization’s network or devices—which can be used to gather personal, sensitive, or proprietary data.
Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and outlines procedures for oversight, coordination, assessment, and reporting of DoD intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
The mission of RRMC is to support the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, select DoD Components and, as appropriate, non-DoD agencies of the Federal Government, and to enable the execution of DoD mission-essential functions (MEFs) in accordance with DoDD S-5100.44 and continuity of operations (COOP) plans and operational orders.
(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Counterintelligence (CI) Activities Supporting Research, Development, and Acquisition
The CI mission in RDA informs the DoD Components and supporting CDCs of foreign collection threats and detects FIE targeting of defense-related technology. The CI support enables RDA program personnel to implement countermeasures and enables CI to develop activities that negate, counter, penetrate, or exploit an FIE.
This publication provides instructions to law enforcement agencies requesting a mail cover as part of a criminal investigation. All conditions and procedures contained in these instructions must be met before a mail cover can be authorized.
Urban Shield is a continuous, 48-hour Full Scale Multi-Disciplinary Homeland Security/Disaster Preparedness Exercise hosted by the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, with the support of the Bay Area Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and more than 150 local, state, federal, international and private sector partners.
Defense CI activities shall be undertaken as part of an integrated DoD and national effort to detect, identify, assess, exploit, penetrate, degrade, and counter or neutralize intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, espionage, sedition, subversion, assassination, and terrorist activities directed against the Department of Defense, its personnel, information, materiel, facilities, and activities, or against U.S. national security.
This Instruction implements the policy in DoD Directive (DoDD) O-5240.02 to assign responsibilities and establish procedures for conducting CI inquiries within the Department of Defense pursuant to the authority in DoDD 5143.01.